Interpreting a Successful Testing Process: Risk and Actual Coverage by Stoelinga, Mariëlle & Timmer, Mark
Interpreting a Successful Testing Process:
Risk and Actual Coverage
Marie¨lle Stoelinga and Mark Timmer
Formal Methods & Tools Group, Department of Computer Science
University of Twente, The Netherlands
{marielle, timmer}@cs.utwente.nl
Abstract—Testing is inherently incomplete; no test suite will
ever be able to test all possible usage scenarios of a system. It
is therefore vital to assess the implication of a system passing
a test suite. This paper quantifies that implication by means
of two distinct, but related, measures: the risk quantifies the
confidence in a system after it passes a test suite, i.e., the
number of faults still expected to be present (weighted by their
severity); the actual coverage quantifies the extent to which
faults have been shown absent, i.e., the fraction of possible
faults that has been covered. We provide evaluation algorithms
that calculate these metrics for a given test suite, as well as
optimisation algorithms that yield the best test suite for a given
optimisation criterion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software becomes more and more complex, making
thorough testing an indispensable part of the development
process. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology has assessed that software faults cost the American
economy almost sixty billion dollars annually [1]. More than
a third of these costs could be eliminated if testing occurred
earlier in the development process.
An important fact about testing is that it is inherently
incomplete, since testing everything would require infinitely
many input scenarios. On the other hand, passing a well-
designed test suite does increase the confidence in the
correctness of the tested product. Therefore, it is important to
assess the quality of a test suite. Two fundamental concepts
have been put forward to evaluate test suite quality: (1) cov-
erage metrics determine which portion of the requirements
and/or implementation-under-test has been exercised by the
test suite; (2) risk-based metrics assess the risk of putting
the tested product into operation.
Although existing coverage measures, such as code cov-
erage in white-box testing ([2], [3]) and state and/or tran-
sition coverage in black-box testing ([4], [5], [6]), give an
indication of the quality of a test suite, it is not necessarily
true that higher coverage implies that more, or more severe,
faults are detected. This is because these metrics do not
take into account where in the system faults are most likely
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to occur. Risk-based testing methods do aim at reducing
the expected number of faults, or their severity. However,
these are often informal [7], based on heuristics [8], or
indicate which components should be tested best [9], but
rarely quantify the risk after a successful testing process in
a precise way.
In this paper, we present a framework in which risk
and coverage can be defined, computed and optimised in
a black-box manner, for systems with nondeterminism. Key
properties are a rigorous mathematical treatment based on
solid probabilistic models, and the result that lower risk (or
higher coverage) implies a lower expected number of faults.
Overview. The starting point in our theory is a weighted
fault specification (WFS), consisting of (1) a specification
describing the desired system behaviour as an input-output
labelled transition system (IOLTS), (2) a weight function
describing the severity of faults, (3) an error function de-
scribing the probability that a certain error has been made,
and (4) a failure function describing the probability that
incorrectly implemented behaviour yields a failure. The error
probabilities are assumed to be independent, which is partly
justified by abstracting the actual inputs into equivalence
classes. Still, this assumption is quite strict, but we think
that a thorough understanding of simple models is the
best start when tackling the more complex situation with
dependent probabilities. The failure function is based on
the fact that, due to nondeterminism, observing a correct
response once does not yet imply correctness. That is, a
system might respond differently to the same inputs during
different executions.
From the WFS we derive its underlying probability model,
i.e., a random variable that describes the distribution of
(possibly erroneous) implementations. This allows us to
define risk and actual coverage in an easy and precise way.
Given a WFS, we define the risk of a test suite as the
expected fault weight that remains after this test suite passes.
We show how to construct a test suite of a certain size with
minimal expected risk. We also introduce actual coverage
for a test suite, which quantifies the risk reduction obtained
when an implementation passes it. Whereas risk is based on
faults contained within the entire system, actual coverage
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only relates to the part of the system that has been tested.
This matches with the traditional interpretation of coverage.
Our methods refine the theory presented by Branda´n
Briones, Brinksma, and Stoelinga [10]. They introduced a
concept we would call potential coverage, as it considers
which faults can be detected during testing. Our measures,
however, take into account the faults that are actually
covered during a test execution, making them more precise.
While error probabilities and failure probabilities are
important ingredients of our framework, techniques for
obtaining them fall outside the scope of this paper. However,
there is extensive literature on factors that determine them.
For instance, estimations of the error probabilities can be
based on the software change history [11]. They can also
be based on McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity number [12],
Halstead’s set of Software Science metrics [13], and re-
quirements volatility [14]. The failure probabilities can be
obtained by applying one of the many analysis techniques
described in [15] and [16]. In practice it might still be
difficult to estimate all the probabilities that are needed,
asking for simplifying approximations. This paper could
then serve as a baseline for sensitivity analysis [17], making
it possible to assess the impact of these simplifications.
Finally, we note that our measures can easily be applied
at higher abstraction levels. For instance, instead of defining
behaviour in terms of basic actions, it could be defined
in terms of function or module calls. A fault weight then
denotes the severity of an error in a certain module, and error
and failure probabilities describe respectively the expected
presence of faults and occurrence of failures in the modules,
providing risk and coverage measures for module testing.
Organisation of the paper. The model is described in Sec-
tion II, risk in Section III, and actual coverage in Section IV.
Section V discusses conclusions and future work.
Due to space limitations, we refer the reader to the
extended version of the current paper [18] for the proofs.
II. THE WFS MODEL
A. Preliminaries and notations
Definition 1 (Preliminaries). Given a set L, the set of all
sequences over L is denoted by L∗, and the set of non-
empty sequences by L+. If σ, ρ ∈ L∗, then σ is a prefix of
ρ (denoted σ  ρ) if there is a σ′ ∈ L∗ such that σσ′ = ρ.
If σ′ ∈ L+, then σ is a proper prefix of ρ (denoted σ  ρ).
We model systems by IOLTSs, which describe behaviour
by means of states and transitions [19]. Transitions are
always caused by either an input action or an output action.
In order to be able to model realistic systems using IOLTSs,
we apply equivalence partitioning. That is, the inputs are
partitioned into equivalence classes such that one input is
representative for all others in its class [3]. This way, the
action set can be kept finite, often even small.
s0s1 s2
δ
10ct? 20ct?
tea! coffee!
xx.tea!
state w perr pfail
s0 40 0.01 0.4
s1 25 0.07 0.5
s2 25 0.05 0.4
(a) A WFS W
fail pass
passfail fail
x20ct?
coffee! xδ tea!
coffee! xδ tea!
(b) A test case t
Figure 1. A WFS and a test case
Definition 2 (IOLTSs). An IOLTS A is a tuple 〈S, s0, L,Δ〉,
where
• S is a finite set of states, with s0 ∈ S the initial state;
• L is a finite set of actions, partitioned into a set LI of
inputs (suffixed by a question mark) and a set LO of
outputs (suffixed by an exclamation mark);
• Δ ⊆ S × L × S is the transition relation, which
is required to be (internally) deterministic. Formally,
(s, a, s′) ∈ Δ ∧ (s, a, s′′) ∈ Δ =⇒ s′ = s′′.
We write Aspec to denote a specification. An IOLTS Aimpl
is a (potentially incorrect) implementation of Aspec if it has
the same alphabet and is input-enabled, i.e., for all s ∈ S
and a ∈ LI, there exists an s′ ∈ S with (s, a, s′) ∈ Δ. The
set of possible implementations of A is denoted by IMPLA.
Definition 3 (Paths and traces). Let A = 〈S, s0, L,Δ〉
be an IOLTS, then a path in A is a finite sequence of
states and actions π = s0a1s1a2 . . . ansn, with s0 = s0
and ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} : (si, ai+1, si+1) ∈ Δ. The set of
all paths in A is denoted by pathsA.
Each path π has a trace associated with it, denoted by
trace(π) and given by the sequence of the actions of π.
From the set of all paths in A we can deduce the set of all
traces in A: tracesA = {trace(π) | π ∈ pathsA}.
We use A[σ] for the set of outputs that A can provide as
a response to σ, i.e., A[σ] = {b! ∈ LO | σb! ∈ tracesA}.
A trace σ is implemented incorrected by Aimpl if Aimpl
might respond incorrectly to it, i.e., if Aimpl[σ] 
⊆ Aspec[σ].
Example 1. The upper part of Figure 1(a) shows an IOLTS.
Its states are represented by circles, and its initial state by an
extra inner circle. The special action δ (quiescence) is used
to denote that the absence of any output action is required.
An example path in A is (s0 20ct? s2 coffee! s0 10ct? s1
tea! s0). The corresponding trace is (20ct? coffee! 10ct?
tea!). It holds that A[10ct?] = {tea!}. (For readability,
parentheses are often placed around traces and paths.)
B. Weighted Fault Specifications
Since it is uncertain which faults are introduced, devel-
oping an implementation can be described by a random
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experiment. For each trace, we specify the probability that
an implementation might respond incorrectly; its error prob-
ability. These probabilities are assumed to be independent,
which corresponds to the assumptions made in equivalence
partitioning. There, the assumption is that correctness of a
single input of an equivalence class implies correctness of
all other inputs in its class, whereas it implies nothing about
the correctness of inputs in other equivalence classes.
Since not all failures that can occur at a certain trace will
actually occur when executing that trace once, we specify
a failure function. This function yields, for any trace σ,
the probability that an implementation produces an incorrect
output directly after σ during an arbitrary execution.
Finally, a fault weight is specified for each trace, denoting
the severity of an incorrect implementation with respect to
that trace (or rather, its equivalence class). The higher a fault
weight, the higher the severity.
A specification together with fault weights, error proba-
bilities, and failure probabilities, constitutes a weighted fault
specification.
Definition 4 (WFSs). A WFS (weighted fault specification)
is a tuple W = 〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail〉, with
• Aspec = 〈S, s0, L,Δ〉 an IOLTS;
• w : tracesAspec → R≥0 a weight function assigning
a fault weight to each trace of Aspec, such that 0 <∑
σ∈tracesAspec w(σ) < ∞. This constraint allows us
to define a coverage notion relative to the total weight∑
σ∈tracesAspec w(σ). The fault weight w(σ) denotes
the severity of an erroneous output directly after σ;
• perr : tracesAspec → [0, 1] an error function assigning
to each trace σ of Aspec the probability perr(σ) that an
implementation can provide an incorrect output directly
after σ, i.e., that for an arbitrary Aimpl it holds that
Aimpl[σ] 
⊆ Aspec[σ];
• pfail : tracesAspec → [0, 1] a failure function assigning
to each trace σ of Aspec the probability pfail(σ) that
an arbitrary implementation Aimpl with Aimpl[σ] 
⊆
Aspec[σ] responds incorrectly to σ.
An implementation of W is an implementation of Aspec.
Since w, perr and pfail have infinite domains, they cannot
be specified directly, and we need a finite way of rep-
resenting them. We will specify perr in an easy way by
simply assigning a value perr(s) to each state s, and defining
perr(σ) = perr(last(σ)), where last(σ) is the last state of the
path associated with σ. Analogously, pfail is defined.
Following [10], w can be specified by truncation, i.e.,
explicitly specifying the fault weight of all traces smaller
than a certain size and defining all others to have fault
weight zero. Alternatively, fault weights can be assigned to
the states and a discount factor λ can be used to determine
the fault weights of traces; that is, w(σ) = w(last(σ)) ·λ|σ|,
where |σ| is the number of transitions of σ. Choosing
0 ≤ λ < 1m , with m the maximal outdegree of the IOLTS,
this keeps the accumulated fault weight of all traces finite.
Note that it is also sufficient to only apply this restriction to
the derivation for traces larger than some threshold, and use
a different (or no) discount factor for the shorter traces.
Our framework does not rely on the way w, perr, and pfail
are specified, and thus can handle any of the above methods.
Example 2. In all examples we will use λ = 0.9 for short
traces (all traces explicitly used in examples being short). A
specification of w, perr and pfail for the states of the IOLTS
of the previous example is shown in Figure 1(a). Given for
example σ = (20ct? coffee!), consequently w(σ) = 40 ·
0.92 = 32.4. Also, perr(σ) = 0.01 and pfail(σ) = 0.4.
The fault weight of an implementation Aimpl is defined as
the total fault weight of all incorrectly implemented traces.
Definition 5 (Fault weight). Let W = 〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail〉
be a WFS and Aimpl an implementation of W , then the fault
weight of Aimpl is defined by
w(Aimpl) =
∑
σ∈tracesAspec
Aimpl[σ] ⊆Aspec[σ]
w(σ) ,
which is less than infinity by the assumptions on w.
C. Test Cases and Test Suites
To investigate the quality of systems, test cases and suites
are used. Following ioco theory [19], we require test cases
for IOLTSs to be fail fast; they stop directly after observing
a failure. Test cases repeatedly either perform an input action
or observe which output action a system provides.
Definition 6 (Test cases and suites). (i) A test case t for an
IOLTS Aspec = 〈S, s0, L,Δ〉 is a prefix-closed, finite subset
of L∗, such that for all σ ∈ L∗, a? ∈ LI, and a! ∈ LO
• if σa? ∈ t, then ∀b ∈ L : b 
= a? =⇒ σb 
∈ t;
• if σa! ∈ t, then ∀b! ∈ LO : σb! ∈ t;
• if σ 
∈ tracesAspec , then ∀σ′ ∈ L+ : σσ′ 
∈ t.
A test suite T is a tuple of test cases, denoted 〈t1, . . . , tn〉.
(ii) An execution of t is a trace σ ∈ t such that there is
no ρ ∈ t with σ  ρ, i.e., σ is a maximal element of t. The
set of all executions of t is denoted by exect. An observing
trace of t is a trace that is followed by an observation, i.e.,
a trace σ ∈ t such that ∀b! ∈ LO : σb! ∈ t.
(iii) An execution of a test suite 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 is a sequence
E = 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉, such that σi is an execution of ti for all
i. It is a correct execution if σi ∈ tracesAspec for all i.
(iv) For each test suite execution E = 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉 and
trace σ ∈ L∗, we define obs(σ,E) as the number of times
E observed directly after σ, i.e., obs(σ,E) = |{i | ∀b! ∈
LO : σb!  σi}|. We use obs(σ, T ) to denote the number
of times an execution of T might observe after σ, i.e.,
obs(σ, T ) = |{i | ∀b! ∈ LO : σb! ∈ ti}|. The set of all
observing traces of T is given by obsT =
⋃
ti∈T {σ ∈ ti |∀b! ∈ LO : σb! ∈ ti}.
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Example 3. A test case t for the IOLTS of the previous
examples is shown in Figure 1(b). We have exect = {(20ct?
δ), (20ct? tea!), (20ct? coffee! coffee!), (20ct? coffee! δ),
(20ct? coffee! tea!)}. The set of observing traces of the test
suite T = 〈t〉 is obsT = {(20ct?), (20ct? coffee!)}.
Let T = 〈t, t〉 be a test suite containing t twice. The
maximum number of times an execution of T may observe
after σ = (20ct? coffee!) is obs(σ, T ) = 2. However, given
the execution E = 〈(20ct? tea!), (20ct? coffee! δ)〉 there
was only one such observation, so obs(σ,E) = 1.
D. Underlying Probability Model
Since we only care which traces are handled incorrectly,
and we do not care about the incorrect responses, we
partition the possible implementations into classes of imple-
mentations that respond correctly to exactly the same traces.
Definition 7 (Classification relation). Let Aspec be a speci-
fication, and Aimpl1 and Aimpl2 two of its implementations,
then the relation ∼Aspec is defined by
Aimpl1 ∼Aspec Aimpl2 iff
∀σ ∈ tracesAspec : Aimpl1[σ] ⊆ Aspec[σ] ⇔ Aimpl2[σ] ⊆ Aspec[σ] .
We use [[Aimpl]]Aspec to denote the equivalence class of
Aimpl with respect to the relation ∼Aspec , and leave out
the subscript Aspec whenever no confusion arises.
We lift the fault weight of implementations to classes of
implementations by saying that w([[Aimpl]]) = w(Aimpl).
The function perr of a WFS induces a random variable
AW over the equivalence classes of ∼Aspec . Because the
number of possible implementations is uncountable, AW is
a continuous random variable and hence the probability of
every individual implementation is 0.
Definition 8 (AW ). Let W = 〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail〉 be a
WFS, then we define AW : Ω → IMPLAspec/∼ to be the
random variable representing the equivalence class of an
arbitrary implementation of W .
We will often use the event that AW = [[Aimpl]] such that
Aimpl[σ] ⊆ Aspec[σ], and denote this by AW [σ] ⊆ Aspec[σ].
Note that by definition P[AW [σ] ⊆ Aspec[σ]] = 1−perr(σ).
For each test suite T , the error function and failure func-
tion also induce a random variable representing the execution
of T . After all, due to nondeterminism the same test suite
might test different traces during different executions.
Definition 9 (RW,T ). Let W = 〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail〉 be a
WFS and T = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 a test suite for Aspec, then we
define RW,T : Ω → exect1 × exect2 × · · · × exectn to be
the random variable representing the result of executing T
against an arbitrary implementation of W .
Note that the distribution of RW,T depends on the distri-
bution of outputs the system provides. However, we do not
need the explicit distribution of RW,T here.
III. RISK
A. Test Evaluation with Respect to Risk
Having defined a formal framework, we can now define
the measures of interest. First of all, when a test suite passes,
we want to estimate the number of faults that remained
undetected. To also incorporate the severity of these faults,
we define the risk of an implementation after passing a test
suite as its expected remaining fault weight, i.e., the expected
number of remaining faults weighted by their severity.
Definition 10 (Risk). Let W = 〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail〉 be a
WFS, T a test suite for Aspec, and E a correct execution of
T . Then, the risk of an arbitrary implementation of W after
executing T yielded E is defined by
riskW (T,E) = E[w(AW ) | RW,T = E] .
For this conditional expectation to be defined properly,
P[RW,T = E] has to be nonzero. However, since E is ex-
actly the execution we observed, P[RW,T = E] is obviously
nonzero and consequently no extra restriction is imposed.
Due to nondeterminism, the absence of a failure during
testing does not yet prove its absence. Therefore, to compute
the risk we need the probability that a trace has been
implemented incorrectly even though a test suite passes; its
posterior error probability.
Definition 11 (PEP). Let W = 〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail〉 be a
WFS, T a test suite for Aspec, E a correct execution of T ,
and σ ∈ tracesAspec . Then, the posterior error probability
(PEP) of σ, after T yielded E, is defined by
PEPW (σ, T,E) = P[AW [σ] 
⊆ Aspec[σ] | RW,T = E] .
Some executions of E may have performed an input
action after σ, and are therefore not able to detect incorrect
behaviour directly after σ. Hence, to compute the PEP we
have to count the executions reaching σ and observing
afterwards; this is precisely given by obs(σ,E). Keeping
this in mind, the following proposition can be obtained using
Bayes’ formula. A proof of this, and of all other propositions
and theorems of this paper, can be found in [18].
Proposition 1. Let W = 〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail〉 be a WFS,
T a test suite for Aspec, E a correct execution of T , and
σ ∈ tracesAspec . Then
PEPW (σ, T,E)
=
(1− pfail(σ))obs(σ,E) · perr(σ)
(1− pfail(σ))obs(σ,E) · perr(σ) + 1− perr(σ) .
Since PEPW (σ, T,E) only depends on W , σ and
obs(σ,E), we use PEPW (σ, n) to denote PEPW (σ, T,E)
with obs(σ,E) = n.
It is not difficult to see that the value of riskW (T,E)
in principle can be computed by ranging over all traces of
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Aspec, summing their fault weight multiplied by their PEP:
riskW (T,E) =
∑
σ∈tracesAspec
w(σ) · PEPW (σ, T,E) .
However, as there are infinitely many traces, this formula
cannot be evaluated in practice (unless truncation was used
to specify w). To solve this, we first compute the initial risk:
riskW (〈〉, 〈〉) =
∑
σ∈tracesAspec
w(σ) · perr(σ) .
In case of discounting this formula can easily be evaluated
using a system of linear equations, very similar to how [10]
computes the total coverage
∑
σ∈L∗ w(σ). Now, for all
traces σ ∈ obsT we subtract the risk reduction that was
obtained by E. Considering that the initial risk of every trace
σ is w(σ) · perr(σ), the following theorem easily follows.
Theorem 1. Let W = 〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail〉 be a WFS, T a
test suite for Aspec, and E a correct execution of T . Then
riskW (T,E) = riskW (〈〉, 〈〉)−∑
σ∈obsT
w(σ) · (perr(σ)− PEPW (σ, T,E)) .
Complexity. The complexity of risk evaluation is in O(n3 +
p log(m)), with n the number of states of Aspec, m the size
of T , and p the size of obsT .
The term n3 comes from calculating riskW (〈〉, 〈〉), which
is shown to be of this complexity in [10]. Then, the sum-
mation yields p summands, each of them requiring some
exponentiations (worst case in O(log(m))).
Example 4. Again consider the WFS of the previous ex-
amples. Assume that discounting was defined such that
riskW (〈〉, 〈〉) = 10.
Let T be the test suite 〈t, t〉, with t the test case of
Figure 1(b). Suppose that T is executed, yielding E =
〈(20ct? tea!), (20ct? coffee! δ)〉. To determine riskW (T,E),
we calculate the risk reduction obtained by E, and sub-
tract this from the initial risk (following Theorem 1). As
risk can only be reduced by observing traces, we only
have to consider the traces that are in the set obsT =
{(20ct?), (20ct? coffee!)}.
Since E observed twice after σ1 = (20ct?), the risk
reduction by this trace is
w(σ1) · (perr(σ1)− PEPW (σ1, 2))
= (25 · 0.9)
(
0.05− 0.6
2 · 0.05
0.62 · 0.05 + 1− 0.05
)
= 0.707.
Since E observed once after σ2 = (20ct? coffee!), the risk
reduction by this trace is
w(σ2) · (perr(σ2)− PEPW (σ2, 1))
= (40 · 0.92)
(
0.01− 0.6
1 · 0.01
0.61 · 0.01 + 1− 0.01
)
= 0.129.
Thus, we obtain
riskW (T,E) = 10− (0.707 + 0.129) = 9.164 .
B. Estimating Output Behaviour to Predict Risk Reduction
Due to nondeterministic behaviour, risk has been defined
for IOLTSs based on a test suite and an execution. However,
to find an optimal test suite, we need to estimate risk without
knowing the execution in advance. It is therefore necessary
to estimate output behaviour, for which we extend the WFS
model to also include output probabilities pout.
Definition 12 (WFS+). A WFS+ is a tuple W =
〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail, pout〉, where the first four elements con-
stitute a WFS, and pout : tracesAspec ×LO → [0, 1] is a
function assigning to each trace σ and output action a! the
probability pout(σ, a!) that the system provides an a! after
σ, given that no failures occur.
Given a test case t and a trace σ ∈ t, the probability
preach(σ) of actually reaching σ when t is executed (given
that no failures occur) can easily be calculated using pout.
As inputs are chosen by the test case, we set pout(σ, a?) = 1
for all traces σ and input actions a? ∈ LI.
Proposition 2. Let W = 〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail, pout〉 be a
WFS+ and t a test case for Aspec, then preach(σ) =∏n
i=1 pout(a1 . . . ai−1, ai) for all σ = a1a2 . . . an ∈ t.
Now, letting riskW (T ) be the random variable represent-
ing the expected risk after a random execution of T , the
following result holds.
Theorem 2. Let W = 〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail, pout〉 be a
WFS+ and T a test suite for Aspec. Then
E[riskW (T )] = riskW (〈〉, 〈〉)−
∑
σ∈obsT
w(σ)·⎛
⎝ obs(σ,T )∑
i=0
(
obs(σ, T )
i
)
· preach(σ)i·
(1− preach(σ))obs(σ,T )−i · (perr(σ)− PEPW (σ, i))
⎞
⎠ .
Proof (sketch).: To obtain this formula, we started
with Theorem 1 and replaced perr(σ) − PEPW (σ, T,E)
(the error probability reduction for E) by the expected
error probability reduction for an arbitrary execution. This
reduction depends on the number of times the execution
observes after σ, which is by definition between 0 and
obs(σ, T ). The probability of observing i times is equal to
obtaining i successes in a binomially distributed experiment
with n = obs(σ, T ) and p = preach(σ). Using these
observations, Theorem 1, and the familiar formula for the
binomial distribution, we obtain Theorem 2.
Complexity. The complexity of risk prediction is in O(n3 +
255
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITEIT TWENTE. Downloaded on August 26, 2009 at 02:15 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
fail pass
passfail fail
x20ct? (1.0)
(0.6) coffee! xδ (0.0) tea! (0.4)
(0.0) coffee! xδ (1.0) tea! (0.0)
Figure 2. A test case with output probabilities
pm log(m) + p3), with n the number of states of Aspec, m
the size of T , and p the size of obsT .
Again, the term n3 comes from calculating riskW (〈〉, 〈〉).
Then, the outer summation yields p summands. For each
of these the inner summation yields at most m summands,
each of them requiring some exponentiations (worst case in
O(log(m))). Finally, the binomials
(
s
0
)
, . . . ,
(
s
s
)
are required
for all s ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Since each of them requires at most
2s multiplications, this is in O(p3).
Example 5. Using the WFS W and test suite T of the
previous examples again, we compute E[riskW (T )]. First,
we specify the relevant output probabilities to make it into
a WFS+; see Figure 2. Since we assume that test suite
executions pass (otherwise we improve the system and test
again), the incorrect outputs have been given probability 0.
Now, we can easily calculate preach(20ct?) = 1.0, and
preach(20ct? coffee!) = 1.0 · 0.6 = 0.6. Using Theorem 2,
we obtain the following (the full calculation is in [18]).
E[riskW (T )] = · · · = 10− 0.707− 0.136 = 9.157 .
The risk that was calculated in Example 4 is indeed almost
equal to this expected value.
C. Test Optimisation with Respect to Risk
Using risk prediction we can now compute optimal test
suites with respect to risk. Let W = 〈A, w, perr, pfail, pout〉
be a WFS+, T a test suite for A, σ a trace of A, and
assume that obs(σ, T ) = n. Since each trace σ contributes
w(σ) · perr(σ) to riskW (〈〉, 〈〉), Theorem 2 implies that the
contribution of σ to the expected risk after T passes is
c(σ, n) = w(σ) ·
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
preach(σ)i(1− preach(σ))n−i·
PEPW (σ, i) .
Note that c(σ, n) only takes into account the contribution of
σ itself, not of its prefixes. It is easy to see that adding a
new test case to T that observes after σ yields an expected
risk reduction (ERR) of r(σ, n) = c(σ, n)− c(σ, n + 1).
Using these insights, we can now construct
T opt-riskW,k,d = argmin
T=〈t1,...,tk〉
E[riskW (T )] ,
i.e., a test suite of size k with minimal expected risk. As an
extra restriction, we limit the depth of each test case to d to
obtain a finite test suite.
To compute the best test case (i.e., the one having maximal
ERR) of depth d to add to a test suite T , we first derive a
recursive equation for the maximal ERR obtained by such a
test case. To express this as a function of the maximal ERR
of its sub test cases of depth d − 1, we also have to keep
track of the trace seen thus far. We therefore let MT (σ, d′)
denote the maximal ERR to be obtained by a sub test case
of depth d′ with history σ. Note that we are looking for
MT (, d).
For d′ = 0, trivially MT (σ, d′) = 0. For an arbitrary
d′ > 0, MT (σ, d′) is calculated inductively by looking
at the first step of the test case. Starting with an input
a? ∈ LI such that σa? ∈ tracesA, no ERR is obtained
directly and we are left with MT (σa?, d′−1). Starting with
observation, an ERR of r(σ, obs(σ, T )) is obtained. Then,
some output b! is provided, leaving us withMT (σb!, d′−1).
As the probability of choosing each individual b! is already
accounted for in c(σ, n), no weighted average is taken.
Formalising these observations, we obtain
MT (σ, d′) =
{
0 if d′ = 0
max (doInput, observe) if d′ > 0 ,
where
doInput = max
a?∈LI
σa?∈tracesA
MT (σa?, d′ − 1) ,
observe = r(σ, obs(σ, T )) +
∑
b!∈LO
σb!∈tracesA
MT (σb!, d′ − 1) .
To construct T opt-riskW,k,d , we start with T = 〈〉 and com-
pute MT (, d): the maximum expected risk reduction to
be obtained by a test case of depth d. Algorithmically,
we start bottom-up by calculating MT (σd−1, 1) for all
σd−1 ∈ tracesA of length d− 1. Based on these values, we
can calculateMT (σd−2, 2) for all σd−2 ∈ tracesA of length
d− 2. Working our way up, we arrive at MT (, d). During
the calculations we record for eachMT (ρ, l) whether it was
obtained by observation or an input (and which one).
Now, the first step of the best test case t1 is the action
(or observation) that was chosen to maximise MT (, d).
Then, suppose that a ∈ L was performed, we do an input or
observe, according to which was chosen for MT (a, d− 1),
and so on, until depth d has been reached.
After having set T = {t1}, the best test case t2 to add
to T can be found by repeating the procedure described
above. Since only a part of the state space changes, this can
be calculated efficiently. We just continue in this way until
|T | = k and then set T opt-riskW,k,d = T .
In [18] the algorithm is formalised and proved correct.
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Complexity. Note that the above method is very simi-
lar to history-dependent backwards induction, known from
Markov decision theory [20]. The complexity of finding each
test case to add to T is therefore exponential in its depth,
and because of history-dependence cannot be improved to
polynomial complexity.
Example 6. Using the WFS+ W of the previous examples
once more, we calculate the optimal test suite T opt-riskW,2,3 of
size 2 and depth 3. We still assume preach(20ct? coffee!) =
0.6 and preach(20ct? tea!) = 0.4, and a discount rate of
λ = 0.9 for short traces.
We first calculate MT (σ2, 1) for all traces of length 2:
MT (δ δ, 1) = max
(
MT (δ δ 10ct?, 0),MT (δ δ 20ct?, 0),
r(δ δ, 0) +MT (δ δ δ, 0)
)
= max(0, 0, 0.129) = 0.129
MT (δ 10ct?, 1) = · · · = 0.683
MT (δ 20ct?, 1) = · · · = 0.393
MT (10ct? tea!, 1) = · · · = 0.129
MT (20ct? tea!, 1) = · · · = 0.052
MT (20ct? coffee!, 1) = · · · = 0.077
Note that this confirms the intuition that it is best to observe
in the final step, since performing an input has no effect on
the risk. Continuing, we calculate
MT (δ, 2) = max
(
MT (δ 10ct?, 1),MT (δ 20ct?, 1),
r(δ, 0) +MT (δ δ, 1)
)
= max(0.683, 0.393, 0.143 + 0.129) = 0.683
MT (10ct?, 2) = max
(
r(10ct?, 0) +MT (10ct? tea!, 1)
)
= max(0.759 + 0.129) = 0.889
MT (20ct?, 2) = max
(
r(20ct?, 0) +MT (20ct? tea!, 1)
+MT (20ct? coffee!, 1)
)
= max(0.436 + 0.052 + 0.077) = 0.565
MT (, 3) = max
(
MT (10ct?, 2),MT (20ct?, 2),
r(, 0) +MT (δ, 2)
)
= max(0.889, 0.565, 0.159 + 0.683) = 0.889
Apparently, the maximum expected risk reduction that can
be obtained by a test case of depth 3 is 0.889. Based on the
calculations above, we can deduce the corresponding test
case, which is depicted in Figure 3(a).
To find the second test case to include in T , we per-
form the same calculations, only now using r(10ct?, 1) and
r(10ct? tea!, 1) instead of r(10ct?, 0) and r(10ct? tea!, 0),
since obs(σ, T ) is now 1 for them. In fact, only a part of
the calculations has to be repeated.
We find the test case shown in Figure 3(b), which yields
an additional expected risk reduction of 0.842. As this
calculation uses the fact that the first test case was already
present, the values can just be added to find that the optimal
fail fail
passfail fail
x10ct?
coffee! xδ tea!
coffee! xδ tea!
(a) The first test case
fail fail
pass fail pass
x10ct?
coffee! xδ tea!
coffee! xδ tea!
(b) The second test case
Figure 3. An optimal test suite
test suite of size two has an expected risk reduction of
0.889 + 0.842 = 1.731.
IV. ACTUAL COVERAGE
Whereas risk gives us information about the entire system,
coverage only relates to the part of a system we tested.
Basically, we define the absolute actual coverage
(absCov) of a test suite T as the accumulated fault weight of
the traces that are known to be implemented correctly after
T passes. However, due to nondeterminism we often only
reduce the probability of the presence of faults, so we need
a more precise notion. We therefore introduce relative error
probability reduction (REPR) as the extent to which the
error probability of a trace decreases as a result of passing
a test suite. Then, absCov is defined as the sum of all fault
weights, each weighted by the corresponding REPR.
To assess the quality of a test suite, we calculate its
absolute actual coverage relative to the total amount of fault
weight that could potentially be present in the system. This
measure will be called its relative actual coverage (relCov).
(See [10] for an algorithm to compute totCov efficiently).
Definition 13 (Coverage measures). Let W =
〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail〉 be a WFS, T a test suite for
Aspec, and E a correct execution of T . Then we define
REPRW (σ, T,E) =
perr(σ)− PEPW (σ, T,E)
perr(σ)
;
absCovW (T,E) =
∑
σ∈tracesAspec
w(σ) · REPRW (σ, T,E) ;
totCovW =
∑
σ∈tracesAspec
w(σ) ;
relCovW (T ) =
absCovW (T )
totCovW
.
Note that since weight functions never sum up to zero or
infinity, relative actual coverage is properly defined.
Using Proposition 1, the following result can easily be
obtained, providing a formula for computing actual cover-
age. Note that it reduced to a finite sum, since the traces not
in obsT have no REPR and can therefore be omitted.
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Theorem 3. Let W = 〈Aspec, w, perr, pfail〉 be a WFS, T a
test suite for Aspec, and E a correct execution of T . Then
absCovW (T,E) =
∑
σ∈obsT
w(σ)·
(
1− (1− pfail(σ))
obs(σ,E)
1− perr(σ) + (1− pfail(σ))obs(σ,E) · perr(σ)
)
.
Optimisation with respect to actual coverage can be done
in exactly the same way as optimisation with respect to risk,
only using expected coverage increase instead of expected
risk reduction.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
While testing is an important part of today’s software
development process, little research has been devoted to
the interpretation of a successful testing process. In this
paper, we introduced a weighted fault specification (WFS)
to describe the required behaviour of a system and the
estimation of its probabilistic behaviour. Based on such a
WFS, we presented two measures: risk and actual coverage.
Risk denotes the confidence in the system after testing is
successful, whereas actual coverage denotes how much was
tested.
We presented a method to compute the risk of a system
after it successfully passes a test suite, as well as a way
to calculate the quality of a given test suite with respect
to risk. We also gave an optimisation strategy enabling the
tester to obtain a test suite of a given size that will obtain
minimal risk. All are easily adaptable to work with actual
coverage. Although we made some strict assumptions on
error independence, we think that a thorough understanding
of simple models is a useful start when tackling these
complicated problems.
Our work gives rise to several directions for future re-
search. First, it is crucial to validate our framework by
developing tool support and performing case studies. Sec-
ond, it seems useful to include fault dependencies in our
model. Third, the possibilities of on-the-fly test derivations
(e.g., as performed by the tool TorX [21]) based on risk or
actual coverage could be investigated. This may yield a tool
that, during testing, calculates probabilities and decides how
to test optimally. Finally, our framework may be used to
study the sensitivity of the probabilities, validating potential
simplifying approximations for risk and actual coverage.
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